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AN ANALYSIS OF ETHICAL ISSUES
IN PRESCRIBING AND DISPENSING
SYRINGES TO INJECTION
DRUG USERS
Zita Lazzarini, J.D., M.P.H.'
I. INTRODUCTION
PHYSICIANS CARING FOR PATIENTS at risk of
HIV infection, or those already infected, face many complex
decisions. Perhaps some of the most contentious are the phy-
sicians' and health agencies' roles in HIV prevention among
active injection drug users (IDUs), and specifically whether
health care providers or the government should endorse and
support efforts to provide sterile syringes to drug users. Con-
siderable attention, both public and scholarly, has focused on
the appropriate use of syringe exchange programs (SEPs).
Less debate has centered on efforts to deregulate syringes
(remove prescription requirements or limits on possession)
and the practice of physicians prescribing syringes to ]DUs.
This article considers two questions: whether it is ethical for
physicians to prescribe, and pharmacists to dispense, syringes
to IDUs, and whether physicians and pharmacists have an
affirmative ethical duty to do so.
This article begins by describing the dilemma, and then
discusses the ethical framework of the physician-patient and
pharmacist-patient relationships. Next, this article considers
several roles the law plays in relation to these questions. In
conclusion, the article suggests that the weight of ethical rea-
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ert Wood Johnson Project who made helpful suggestions and comments on the manu-
script, Jonathan Shapiro and Lorilyn Rosales for excellent research assistance during
the course of writing the article, and Mitzi Ng for help in manuscript preparation.
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soning supports physicians' choice to prescribe and pharma-
cists' to dispense syringes to IDUs.
The Problem
An estimated 1.1 to 1.5 million persons in the United States
use injection drugs.' Injection drug users risk contracting viral
diseases, such as hepatitis B and C, and HIV, parasitic infec-
tions, including malaria, and bacterial illnesses, such as endo-
carditis from using contaminated injection equipment. Injection
drug use may cause as many as half of all new HIV infections
nationwide.2 Injection drug use has been the leading risk factor
associated with new AIDS cases in the northeast since 1988.3
As a consequence, public health officials, clinicians, and policy
makers have sought effective means to reduce injection drug
use, get active IDUs into treatment, and reduce the risk that
DUs not in treatment will contract HIV or transmit it to their
sexual partners, children, and other IDUs. Active IDUs can take
relatively simple steps to avoid blood-borne infections by using
a sterile syringe for each injection, not sharing drug preparation
equipment with other IDUs, and not mixing drugs with other
DUs.
Structural impediments in most states (laws, regulations,
and policies), however, make it dangerous or impossible for4
DUs to obtain and carry sterile syringes, despite the fact that
these syringes might save their lives. Many health officials and
activists support syringe exchange programs as one means to
provide sterile syringes to DUs who cannot otherwise obtain
I See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNcIL, COMM. ON AIDS RESEARCH & BE.
HAVIORAL, SocIAL, & STATISTICAL SCIENCES, AIDS: SExuAL BEHAVIOR AND
INTRAVENOUS DRUG USE 225 (Charles F. Turner et al. eds., 1989); see also Timothy
J. Dondero, Jr. et al., Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States:
A Review of the Current Knowledge, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. I
(Supp. 6 1987). See generally American Med. Ass'n, JAMA HIV/AIDS Information
Center (visited Oct. 9,2000) <http:www.ama-assn.orgspecia/hiv/hivhome.htm>.
2 See Scott D. Holmberg, The Estimated Prevalence and Incidence of HIV in
96 Large US Metropolitan Areas, 86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 642,642-54 (1996).
3 See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Update: Syringe Exchange
Programs-United States, 1997,47 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 652, 652
(1998) (noting 1997 statistics of syringe exchange programs).
4 See Lawrence 0. Gostin & Zita Lazzarini, Prevention of HIVIAIDS Among
Injection Drug Users: The Theory and Science of Public Health and Criminal Justice
Approaches to Disease Prevention, 46 EMORY L.J. 587,595-642 (1997) (detailing the
laws that limit syringe sales in the United States and American territories).
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them legally.5 Some jurisdictions have modified existing laws to
permit IDUs either to possess syringes (e.g., Oregon) or to pur-
chase syringes without a prescription (e.g., Connecticut and
Maine).6
Despite exhaustive empirical studies showing the overall
beneficial impact of SEPs and syringe deregulation, 7 heated
public debate continues to focus on whether government should
ever actively participate in providing syringes to IDUs. In the
year 2000, after nearly twenty years of the AIDS epidemic, the
U.S. remains without a national policy to support increased ac-
cess to sterile syringes as part of a comprehensive HIV control
policy, and with many state and local laws that continue to dis-
courage safe injection behavior by IDUs.
Physicians caring for IDU patients have limited options for
HIV prevention. They know their patients risk contracting HIV
and other blood-borne diseases from contaminated injection
equipment, in addition to the risk of transmitting these diseases
to others once infected. Many also know that IDUs cannot le-
gally obtain syringes on their own. Physicians have limited
choices to protect their patients' and the public's health. They
may be able to refer their patients to legal SEPs, or even, in a
few states, to advise them to purchase syringes over the counter
in local drug stores. But the majority of physicians caring for
IDUs have no legal source of sterile syringes to offer IDUs, ex-
cept the same source they would offer their diabetic patients, a
prescription. Some physicians would like to be able to prescribe
sterile syringes, but fear possible legal and professional conse-
quences.8 Even where syringes may be purchased legally with-
out a prescription, state law or regulation may demand that
customers demonstrate a "legitimate medical purpose" for their
use. Most pharmacists find a doctor's prescription prima facie
evidence of medical legitimacy. Pharmacists may also be aware
"See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 3, at 652.
6 See id. at 654.
7 See PANEL ON NEEDLE EXCH. & BLEACH DISTRIB. PROGRAMS, NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., PREVENTING HIV TRANSMISSION: THE ROLE OF
STERILE NEEDLES AND BLEACH 198-255 (Jacques Normand et al. eds., 1995) (pro-
viding empirical evidence and recommendations that needle exchange programs offer
public health benefits for the prevention of HIV).
' See Zita Lazzarini et al., In New York City Syringe Laws and Regulations
Deter Physicians and Pharnacistsfron Prescribing and Selling Syringes to Persons
Who May Be Injection Drug Users, 18 J. AcQUIR. IMMUNE DEFic. SYNDR. & HUM.
RETROVIROLOGY S141 (Supp. 11998).
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of, and feel constrained by drug paraphernalia laws that prohibit
sales of paraphernalia, including syringes, where the seller
knows that the user intends to use it to ingest or inject illegal
drugs. 9 In either case, pharmacists may demand customers pro-
duce a prescription even where laws actually do not require one.
In confronting this problem, physicians and pharmacists
ought to ask: whether it is ethical for physicians to prescribe,
and pharmacists to dispense, syringes to IDUs, and whether
physicians and pharmacists have an affirmative ethical duty to
do so. In considering this dilemma, three terms, "law," "ethics,"
and "morals," may cause confusion. For purposes of clarity,
these terms are defined as follows: "law" consists of "norms
formally promulgated by a political authority and more or less
regularly enforced through a legal process based on adjudica-
tion;" "ethics," of "norms shared by a group on a basis of mu-
tual and usually reciprocal recognition;" and "morals," of "no-
tions of right and wrong that guide each of us individually and
subjectively in our daily existence."' 0 Legal parameters are
more easily defined than ethical parameters, since laws must be
reduced to a single form for adoption and enforcement.
Ethics and law, however, are inextricably intertwined since
widely held views of what is "right" and "wrong" (ethics) often
drive formal policy formation (laws). By examining ethical ap-
proaches and related legal theories I hope to shed light on how
professionals and policy makers might approach these issues.
Necessarily, I will also consider the moral concerns that drive
individuals. The debate over the "rightness" of providing sterile
syringes to drug users may be founded on irreducible moral (as
opposed to ethical) conflicts. The failure to reach perfect con-
sensus should not, however, deter those interested in physi-
cians' and pharmacists' obligations to their patients from seek-
ing to make the most reasoned ethical evaluation of the prob-
lem. This article seeks to explore the contours of physicians'
and pharmacists' obligations to their patients who are IDUs, in
the context of the HIV epidemic, recognizing that law, ethics,
and morals each play an important role in this debate.
9 See Gostin & Lazzarini, supra note 4, at 661-62 (describing pharmacist
discretion in choosing to sell syringes to customers and the hurdles pharmacists face
in making such sales).
10 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Law, Morals, and Ethics, 19 S. ILL U. U. 447,
448,453,451 (1995).
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The article does not address the "whole picture" of HIV
prevention. I take it as a given that increased access to syringes,
through SEPs, deregulation, or prescription, cannot be effective
alone and must be part of a comprehensive HIV prevention and
treatment policy that includes integrated programs to prevent
drug use and provides timely access to drug treatment for IDUs.
Ultimately, physician prescriptions for syringes may reach only
a small proportion of IDUs, and therefore, represent a small
public health intervention. However, prescriptions can be a use-
ful clinical tool for individual physicians and their patients. Pre-
scribing also makes a powerful symbolic statement by physi-
cians since it engages physicians directly in HIV prevention
among active IDUs.
H. THE PHYSICIAN'S AND PHARMACIST'S
RELATIONSHIP TO THE PATIENT
A. The Ethics of the Physician-Patient Relationship
1. Fundamental ethical duties and goals
The doctor-patient relationship may be defined as a fiduci-
ary relationship characterized by unequal knowledge and power
in which one party exercises special skills to benefit the other.
As part of this special relationship, physicians have a funda-
mental duty to act in their patients' best interest, to avoid
harming their patients, and to act as their patients' advocates
when necessary." A physician's duty traditionally arises during
the first physician-patient encounter, concomitant with the be-
ginning of the therapeutic relationship.' 2 A duty may arise,
however, without the physician ever meeting the patient face to
face,13 as when a consultant gives advice on treatment of a pa-
tient based on a long-distance consultation.
11 See ToM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESs, PRINCIPLES OF Bio-
MEDICAL ETHICS 430-41 (4 ed. 1994).
12 See, e.g., Weaver v. University of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 506 N.W.2d 264,
267 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a patient-physician relationship is not estab-
lished when the patient does not receive advice or treatment from the doctor).
13 See Johnson v. Padilla, 433 N.E.2d 393, 396 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (granting
summary judgment in favor of defendant physician who concurred in treating physi-
cian's plan to perform medical procedure when plaintiff did not allege the concur-
rence as negligence).
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The content of that duty, what physicians can or ought to
do, is more difficult to define. Professional codes, the common
goals of the profession, and the application of ethical standards
support certain broad principles of conduct, yet thoughtful pro-
fessionals and ethicists can disagree about the details of specific
cases.
Physicians, as professionals, commit themselves to pro-
fessional codes of conduct and ethics which have their roots
in the Hippocratic tradition of ancient Greece, 14 but continue
to be adapted to meet modem dilemmas. 15 Professional codes
are not usually binding as a matter of law, but they represent
important current expressions of professional and societal
norms.
Leading professional organizations define the goals of
medicine broadly: to prevent disease, to restore or preserve
health or function, and to alleviate suffering. 16 Physicians may
also work with patients to achieve other, patient-centered goals,
which are compatible with the goals of medicine, including pa-
tients' social and spiritual goals as they cope with illness and
death.17
2. Ethical theories
No single ethical theory or approach has achieved uni-
versal acceptance as the best or right way to resolve ethical
dilemmas in medicine. Several approaches justify attention in
this case: consequentialist (teleological), nonconsequentialist
(deontological), and the principled approach. These theories,
as well as the concept of "virtue," provide a theoretical basis
for parts of the professional codes of ethics, and can be used
14 See TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 662 ( 14t' ed. 1981).
15 See GEORGE M. BURNELL, FINAL CHOICES: To LIvE OR TO DIE IN AN AGE OF
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 63-64, 344-45 (1993) (discussing the tradition of the Hippo-
cratic Oath); American College of Physicians, Ethics Manual: Fourth Edition, 128
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 576 (1998) (examining emerging medical ethics including
genetic testing, managed care, and organ donation).
16 See American College of Physicians, supra note 15, at 577.
17 See Kathy Faber-Langendoen, Resuscitation of Patients with Metastatic
Cancer: Is Transient Benefit Still Futile?, 151 ARcHivs INTERNAL MED. 235, 235-39
(1991) (describing the importance of knowing a patient's health care goals when
making futility determinations); see also Rosamond Rhodes, Futility and the Goals of
Medicine, 9 J. CLINICAL ETHICs 194, 198-99 (1998) (discussing decision-making
values in relation to "futility" cases including patient autonomy and professional
responsibility to promote the patient's "good").
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both to describe how individuals actually behave (descriptive
ethics) and how they should behave (normative ethics).
Consequentialism determines what is right based on what
result an action brings. For example, in a utilitarian-
consequentialist theory the proper action is the one that
achieves the greatest benefit for the most people. Conse-
quentialists need to know, or estimate, the outcomes of acts
and must use some system to determine what is a "benefit" or
which is the greater "benefit."' 8
By contrast, the deontological approach maintains that the
correctness of an action must be determined independently of its
results. According to deontologists, maintaining other univer-
sally important ideals, including truth telling, confidentiality,
non-discrimination, and obedience to the law are more impor-
tant than the actual outcomes of an act. Therefore, deontologists
will not favor arguments based on the benefits or harms the ac-
tion will bring about.19
Proponents of "virtue" ethics argue that physicians should
embody the character, or virtues, of a good physician: truth, in-
tegrity, loyalty, courage, and compassion, among others. Also
described as "character" ethics, this reasoning stresses the moti-
vations of moral agents, both physicians and patients. Virtue
ethics emphasizes that neither rules nor principles will guaran-
tee ethical choices if the motivations of agents are improper. In
determining the proper course of action, physicians should ask:
(1) how would I act if I was motivated by truthfulness, loyalty,
compassion, and integrity (or other professional virtues)? and
(2) is my chosen action "appropriately gauged to bring about
the desired [result] and [is it] morally justified in conformity
with relevant principles?" 20
The principled approach to biomedical ethics, arguably the
most common approach used in clinical ethics, holds that physi-
cians must strive to respect four basic principles in making
choices: respect for persons (or autonomy), beneficence, non-
maleficence, and justice. 2 1 Thus, the principled approach en-
compasses aspects of both consequentialism and non-
consequentialism. The results of actions remain important
18 See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESs, supra note 11, at 47-53.
19 See id. at 56-62.
20 Id. at 62-65, 66.
2
' Seeid. at 100.
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(helping rather than harming your patient), but the duty to re-
spect individuals' autonomous choices relies more on the right-
ness of the action itself, often independent of its consequences.
Ethical dilemmas arise when an action (or inaction) creates ten-
sion between principles. Critics of the principled approach note
that it contains no formal means to resolve conflicts between
principles.
22
Considering distinct ethical theories elucidates the different
possible approaches to the questions: whether it is ethical for a
physician to prescribe (or a pharmacist to dispense) syringes to
IDUs to prevent blood-borne diseases; and whether the physi-
cian or pharmacist has an affirmative duty to do so. Key issues
that reappear throughout the review of differing ethical ap-
proaches include: (1) the significance of empirical data on ac-
cess to syringes and disease prevention; (2) defining the physi-
cian's role in caring for IDU patients; and (3) the symbolic im-
port of providing syringes versus recommending treatment or
abstinence.
3. Defining ethical duties in new situations: Should
physicians prescribe syringes for IDUs?
Defining a physician's obligations to her IDU patient de-
mands consideration of the nature of the physician's obligation,
available alternatives, and often, practical implications such as
the impact of illegal actions on the physician. IDU patients of-
ten experience a number of serious health and social risks.
Continued use of illegal drugs poses risks of morbidity and
mortality from many causes. 23 Use of injection drugs also
places an IDU at high risk for blood-borne diseases (hepatitis
B and C, MIV), infections caused by non-sterile injections
(endocarditis, local abscesses), overdoses, dependence on
other drugs, and many other infectious diseases related only
indirectly to injection drug use (such as tuberculosis). IDUs
are also disproportionately more likely to be homeless, men-
tally ill, unemployed, and have fragmented families. Thus
2 See id.
2 See Lloyd N. Friedman et al., Tuberculosis, AIDS, and Death Among Sub-
stance Abusers on Welfare in New York City 334 NEw ENG. J. MED. 828 (1996)
(concluding that the incidence of tuberculosis, AIDS, and death is greater among
indigent alcohol and drug users in New York City than the rates of these same out-
comes in the age-matched general population of New York City).
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IDU patients have substantial social service needs, as well as
medical needs.
Ideally, the physician would like to help IDUs stop using
drugs completely. However, not all IDUs will be able, or
willing, to stop immediately. The demand for treatment often
outstrips supply. Drug treatment programs may have waiting
lists or prohibitive entry criteria.24 The absence of childcare
or treatment provision for pregnant women has curtailed ac-
cess by female IDUs. Even after entering treatment, relapses
are common, "[c]ycling one or more times from recovery
back through relapse to dependence or abuse.., is so com-
mon that it must be seen as an intrinsic feature of the natural
history of individual drug behavior." 25 IDUs not in treatment,
for whatever reason, risk deadly infections if they lack access
to sterile syringes or do not practice safe injection practices.
From a practical perspective, physicians must grapple
with the needs of their patients who lack access to treatment,
have attempted treatment and relapsed, or who remain un-
ready for treatment. Despite the government's war on drugs,
including its efforts to restrict access to drugs and syringes,
injection drug use has continued.26 If physicians can take
measures to protect patients from contracting a deadly dis-
ease in the short-term, their patients' long-term prospects for
drug treatment, and eventual return to productive living, are
much more significant.
The physician's basic ethical obligations-to help, not to
harm, and to advocate for patients--support both protecting
patients from blood-borne diseases and discouraging drug
use. Providing competent and compassionate medical care for
24 The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAM-
HSA) website notes a "well documented substance abuse treatment capacity prob-
lem." SAMHSA/CSAT Announces Grant Funding Opportunities (visited Sept. 13,
2000) <http:llwww.samhsa.gov/csattlO43098.htm>.
SAMHSA has made substantial grants in recent years to try to fill that gap.
See Communities ExpandSubstance Abuse Treatment Efforts (visited Sept. 13,2000)
<http:llwww.samhsa.gov/press/99/9910O1nr.htm> (describing 28.8 million dollars in
new SAMHSA grants to combat emerging problems associated with the regional
nature and shifting trends in illicit drug use).
25I INSTm'UTEOFMEDIcINE, TREATING DRUG PROBLEMS 73 (Dean R. Gerstein
& Henrick J. Harwood, eds., 1990).
26 See Jeff Stryker, IV Drug Use and AIDS: Public Policy and Dirty Needles,
14 J. HEALTH POL, POL'Y & LAW 719,733 (1989).
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IDU-patients27 requires physicians to help their patients re-
duce the risk of blood-borne diseases and to stop using drugs
or enter treatment. Physicians should also provide patients
with timely and accurate scientific information regarding
their conditions and treatments. 28
From a consequentialist perspective, the physician ex-
amines the effects of his/her action, including the harms and
benefits associated with that action. Substantial scientific
evidence suggests that increasing access to syringes can re-
duce HIV infections and does not increase drug use or related
crime.29 Also, legal restrictions on access to syringes have not
been shown to reduce drug use or to have any direct public
health benefit. Reliance on empirical data to "prove" the
benefit of a policy practice appeals to scientists, physicians,
and public health officials, but does not address the larger
questions integral to the consequentialist approach: which is
the highest good? and what if the "benefits" conflict?
From a deontological perspective, the physician looks to
the norms of society "[b]ecause normative principles are in-
tegral to the kind of society that is desirable, [therefore] soci-
ety may choose to forgo the benefits of a policy that is
thought to undermine the moral values which the community
holds dear., 30 Our society highly values an individual's free-
dom to control his or her life.3 ' Thus, one approach to evalu-
ating the proper role of physicians in treating IDUs turns
upon on an evaluation of whether IDUs can exercise freedom
of choice-whether they are "autonomous." If addiction or
heavy drug use completely negates an IDU's free will, then
physicians should not take any action that permits continued
drug use, as that would be tantamount to facilitating slav-
ery.
27 See generally ETimcAL DILEMMAS IN HEALTH PROMOTION (Spyros Doxiadis
ed., 1987) (discussing ethical issues in public health and preventive medicine).28 See id.2 9 See PANEL ON NEEDLE EXCH. & BLEACH DISTRIB. PROGRAMS, supra note 7,
at 251-53.30 Gostin & Lazzarini, supra note 4, at 645.
31 See Jeffrey Reiman, Drug Addiction, Liberal Virtue, and Moral Responsi-
bility, in DRUGS, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 25, 26 (Stephen Luper-Foy & Curtis
Brown eds., 1994).
32 See generally Jan Narveson, Drugs and Responsibiliy, in DRUGS, MO-
RALITY, AND THE LAW I, II (Steven Luper-Foy & Curtis Brown eds., 1994) (dis-
cussing John Stuart Mill's view on autonomy).
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If, however, as I have argued, IDUs exercise autonomy,
albeit a compromised autonomy, physicians can then work to
"enhance" their patients' autonomy by not only offering them
support for stopping drug use, but also by giving them the
means to protect themselves from deadly diseases. Restrict-
ing access to syringes denies individuals the opportunity to
take measures to protect their health and to make decisions
affecting their bodies. By allowing individuals the opportu-
nity to make choices that have significant public health bene-
fits, prescribing syringes could prevent disease and preserve
the health of individuals until they can stop using drugs.
Adopting a principled approach, whether or not to pre-
scribe syringes to JDUs appears, at first, to bring the princi-
ples of beneficence and respect for persons into conflict. A
physician might argue that continued drug use clearly harms
the patient and therefore any action on the physician's part
that is "beneficent," seeking to promote the good of the pa-
tient, should discourage and not promote drug use. In con-
trast, respect for persons suggests several important consid-
erations. First, in the sense of "autonomy," respect for per-
sons requires that the physician respect the autonomous
choices of competent patients. If drug users continue to in-
ject, yet want to use sterile syringes to reduce their risk of
infection, then they should be able to exercise an independent
choice to do so. Second, respect for persons suggests that
physicians should strive to respect the humanity and dignity
of each patient, and to refrain from demonizing patients for
socially unacceptable or illegal behaviors, including drug use.
Most physicians would not think of refusing to treat or
ignore the medical needs of their patients who smoke or drink
alcohol, even to excess. By contrast, many doctors do not
want IDUs as patients. Those who do treat IDUs and patients
with a record of injection drug use may not treat their pain
adequately, even when severe pain could be expected (cancer
or other terminal condition), and may be reluctant to provide
them with other interventions out of fear that it will increase
their drug-using behavior.33 When physicians focus exclu-
sively on avoiding any action that could exacerbate IDU pa-
', See TROYEN BRENNAN, JUST DOCTORING: MEDICAL ETHICs IN THE LIBERAL
STATE 148 (1991) (explaining why some care providers might refuse to pursue alter-
native methods of treatment out of fear that it could lead to greater use of illicit
drugs); see also discussion infra, Part II.C.
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tients' drug use, they may actually deny them necessary or
useful care. For many patients who inject drugs, merely being
engaged in the medical system in a positive way is a benefit.
In this context, adopting and enforcing a government prefer-
ence against any action that might appear to condone drug
use, should not occur at the cost of exposing IDUs to HIV.
The government should not inflict harm on an individual as a
means of persuasion.34
Upon closer examination, however, the apparent conflict
between the principles of beneficence and respect for persons
disappears in most cases. The physician's claim to benefi-
cence can, and should, result in efforts to persuade IDUs to
stop using drugs, enter treatment, or stop injecting. Given the
scarcity of drug treatment and the reality that many patients
will relapse before successfully ending their drug use, physi-
cians inevitably will have patients who cannot or will not
stop using drugs, successfully complete treatment, or stop
injecting. Physicians owe a duty of beneficence to these pa-
tients too. For these patients, beneficence requires education
about safer alternatives and access to sterile syringes. Pre-
scribing syringes to patients who are IDUs provides access
and permits patients to reduce the risk of contracting or
transmitting HIV.
Finally, any discussion of HIV and drug use today must
consider the principle of justice. African-Americans and His-
panics bear a disproportionate burden of both of these epi-
demics in the United States. Adding socio-economic status to
the picture reveals a concentration of all three among soci-
ety's most vulnerable communities. Consequently, the poli-
cies we, as a society, adopt to deal with drug use and HIV
will disproportionately affect these communities.
Arguably, communities of color may already feel they
have been ill-served by state and federal policies for
HIV/AIDS prevention, education, medicines, drug treatment,
and other social services.35 Among the most important cri-
tiques of these communities has been the poor access many
minority and impoverished people have to medical treatment
34See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 715 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (discussing contraceptive regulation and arguing that inflicting harm is an "un-
acceptable means of conveying a message that is otherwise legitimate").
35 See PANEL ON NEEDLE EXCH. & BLEACH DISTRIB. PROGRAMS, supra note 7,
at 252.
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for routine care, health promotion, and diagnosis and treat-
ment of chronic conditions. A policy that promotes increased
access by IDUs to regular medical care, that improves their
chances of entering drug treatment and avoiding infection
with HIV and other blood-borne diseases, would also pro-
mote the principle of justice.
Some would argue that despite its potential to prevent
blood-borne diseases, providing IDUs with syringes, via any
mechanism, but particularly from the prescription of a physi-
cian, violates the principle of nonmaleficence, the duty to do
no harm. For example, by arguing that "but for" the physi-
cian's prescription for a needle, a drug user would not have
overdosed and died, or would not have injured others in a
motor vehicle accident. This argument fails because ample
evidence has demonstrated that in the absence of sterile sy-
ringes, IDUs will use whatever is available. Denying IDUs
access to syringes is unlikely to prevent specific harms such
as those described above.
Also noteworthy in this context are the virtues of medi-
cine. Compassionate physicians will recognize all their IDU
patients' needs-both access to drug treatment, and to ways
to prevent blood-borne infections while they remain addicted.
Faithful physicians will not abandon their patient easily, even
when that means facing the legal and ethical challenge of
whether or not to prescribe syringes. Honest physicians will
freely share with their IDU patients everything they know
about ways to prevent blood-borne disease transmission, in-
cluding safer injection practices and how and/or where to
obtain sterile syringes. Courageous physicians will be willing
to incur potential personal risks to promote their patients'
best interests.
The physician has an ethical duty to care for his IDU pa-
tients. This can take several forms: education and counsel-
ing, referrals to drug treatment, or aiding patients in obtain-
ing sterile syringes. If the physician fails to act and the pa-
tient contracts HIV, no future act can undo the harm. By
taking action, the physician can help prevent further injury to
the patient and preserve the chance to treat the patient for
drug addiction at a later time. A variety of ethical approaches
support a physician's option to prescribe syringes. Finding an
affirmative duty, however, applicable to all situations, would
be more difficult.
2001]
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B. The Ethics of the Pharmacist-Patient Relationship
1. The pharmacist's duty and discretion
To varying degrees, pharmacists act independently of
physicians. They may do so in order to fulfill their independ-
ent ethical obligations, to protect the health of "their" pa-
tients, or because they fear violating the law as they under-
stand it. Increasingly, pharmacists strive to define pharmacy
as a profession independent of medicine with its own national
professional bodies, code of ethics, and often, professional
practice guidelines? 6 Thus, some discussion of pharmacists'
ethical duties is relevant to efforts promoting access to sy-
ringes through either over-the-counter sale or expanded pre-
scribing.
Many factors affect pharmacists' decisions to fill pre-
scriptions and to sell syringes over the counter.37 Pharmacists
are aware of, and feel constrained by, laws and regulations
restricting the use, distribution, and sale of syringes.38 In
many states syringe prescription laws and regulations explic-
itly require pharmacists to sell syringes only upon proof of
legitimate medical need. Other states have "voluntary" pre-
scription requirements recognized by pharmacists (no legal
provisions require a prescription, but pharmacists voluntarily
36 See Mark A. Munger et al., Professional Liabilityfor Pharmacists: A Focus
on Pharmacy Practice Acts, 22 DRUG INTEhLIGENCE & CLINICAL PHARMACY 886, 887
(1988) (indicating that it was only about ten years ago that twenty percent of states
did not define pharmacy practice). See generally Stuart Anderson & Virginia Ber-
ridge, Opium in 20th-century Britain: Pharmacists, Regulation and the People, 95
ADDICrtON 23 (2000) (discussing the historical development of pharmaceutical
regulations for the sale and use of opiates in Great Britain and the resulting effects on
community pharmacy practice).
37 See Wilson M. Compton III et al., Legal Needle Buying in St. Louis, 82 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 595 (1992) (reporting study considering pharmacists' decisions to
make over-the-counter sales of syringes); see also Patricia Case et al., Access to Ster-
ile Syringes in Maine: Pharmacy Practice After the 1993 Repeal of the Syringe Pre-
scription Law, 18 J. ACQUIR. IMMUNE DaFIC. SYNDR. & Hum. RETROVIROLOGY, S94
(Supp. 11998).
38 Legal provisions restricting access to syringes include syringe prescription
laws (SP), drug paraphernalia laws (DP) and syringe regulations. See Gostin & Laz-
zarini, supra note 4 (describing the distinct characteristics and distribution of these
legal measures that restrict access to syringes); see also Case et al., supra note 37, at
S94-95 (discussing pharmacist reluctance to sell syringes even after the change in the
law).
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choose to enforce one.) In other jurisdictions, pharmacists are
expressly permitted to refuse to sell syringes that they believe
may be intended for illegal use.39 Even where sale is legal,
the decision to sell syringes without a prescription is often
left to the pharmacist's discretion. Pharmacists can refuse to
sell syringes based on the idea of conscientious objection. 40 A
pharmacist who is unsure if it is proper to sell to a specific
individual may balk at selling syringes without a prescription.
Pharmacists exercise discretion even where customers
present a prescription, perhaps by questioning the validity of
the prescription. A pharmacist might also feel bound to report
physicians, whom they know or whom they suspect of pre-
scribing syringes to IDUs, to the Drug Enforcement Admini-
stration (DEA) or the local licensing and disciplinary author-
ity. Pharmacists might, therefore, derail efforts by individual
physicians to expand IDUs' access to syringes through pre-
scriptions.
From an ethical standpoint, the American Pharmaceutical
Association Code of Ethics states that "[a] pharmacist places
concern for the well-being of the patient at the center of pro-
fessional practice." It also states that "[a] pharmacist pro-
motes the good of every patient in a caring, compassionate,
and confidential manner." Finally, while the pharmacist
serves the individual, the Code states that "[a] pharmacist
[also] serves .. . community, and societal needs. 41
Pharmacists' precise role in promoting the good of the
patient, however, has changed over time. Both the concept of
pharmacists' duties and the definition of "practice" have
grown in recent years.42 Cost control pressures continue to
reduce physicians' time with patients and thus their ability to
educate patients on the correct use of medications or devices.
3 See Gostin & Lazzarini, supra note 4, at 631.
40 See RICHARD R. ABOOD & DAVID B. BRUSHWOOD, PHARMACY PRACTICE
AND THE LAW 306 (1994).
41 American Pharm. Ass'n, Code of Ethics for Pharmacists, 52 AM. J.
HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 2131, 2131 (1995). Some have suggested that needle ex-
change programs give pharmacists an opportunity to engage in promoting public
health. See Peter D. Hurd & Bruce Lubotsky Levin, Public Health and Prevention, in
INTRODUCTION TO HEALTH CARE DELIVERY: A PRIMER FOR PHARMACISTS 171, 175-76
(Robert L. McCarthy ed., 1998) (describing how pharmacists serve both individuals
and communities).42 See Munger et al., supra note 36, at 888 (indicating that with the expansion
of pharmacists' duties and practice, there is a need for standardized guidelines).
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Expanded database collection by pharmacies often produce a
"record" for individual patients that includes much of the in-
formation usually contained in the medical record. As a con-
sequence, pharmacists have taken on some of the screening,
counseling, and education duties previously performed by
doctors.
Traditionally, the duty of the pharmacist was fairly sim-
ple. A pharmacist was required to correctly fill the prescrip-
tions given by a doctor to his patients. The duty was limited
primarily because of physicians' dominant position in health
care during this century. Pharmacists questioning the pre-
scribing practices of a physician might interfere with the phy-
sician-patient relationship. This approach relied on the
"learned intermediary doctrine," in which a physician (the
learned intermediary), not the pharmacist, had the duty to
warn patients about the potential side effects of drugs.43 The
role of the pharmacist was little more than that of a dispenser.
The 1952 Code of Ethics went so far as to explicitly de-
ter pharmacists from giving advice to a customer.44 In this
traditional setting, a pharmacist was only liable if he or she
did not correctly fill the prescription that the doctor pre-
scribed. Thus, a pharmacist was not responsible for advising
customers regarding proper dosage (under this traditional
view, the customer was not considered a patient of the phar-
macist) or warning them of potential dangerous side-effects
of drugs. These responsibilities remained with the physi-
cian.45
Pharmacists' expanded role now encompasses greater
practice, discretion, and duty. In addition to screening out
43 See Lauren Fleischer, From Pill-Counting to Patient Care: Pharmacists'
Standard of Care in Negligence Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 168 (1999).
44 See Code of Ethics of the American Pharmaceutical Association, J. AM.
PHARMACEUTICAL ASS'N: PRACTICAL PHARMACY EDITION 721, 722 (1952); see also
Fleischer, supra note 43, at 168.
45 See Jones v. Irvin, 602 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Ill. 1985) (holding that a phar-
macist does not have a duty to warn a patient or inform a physician that a drug is
prescribed in a dangerous amount or in an amount that might cause an adverse reac-
Lion in the patient); Pysz v. Henry's Drug Store, 457 So.2d 561 (Fla. Dist. CL App.
1984) (holding that pharmacist's duties include filling correct prescriptions with due
care, not policing the individual using the medicine or deciding whether the individ-
ual is addicted); Eldridge v. Eli Lilly & Co., 485 N.E.2d 551 (1ll. App. Ct. 1985)
(holding that a pharmacist has no duty to refuse to fill prescriptions at amounts dan-
gerous to the patient or to warn the physician of the danger).
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"invalid" prescriptions, pharmacists are held responsible for
either notifying a physician or directly warning a patient of
an inadequate instruction in a prescription.46 A pharmacist
may also be held liable for failing to meet certain "minimum
standards" of prescription review, including, on occasion, a
duty to refuse to fill a valid prescription.47 When interpreted
most broadly, that is to hold a pharmacist liable even though
she followed a valid prescription, it suggests a relationship,
and therefore a duty between the pharmacist and customer,
that is independent of the relationship between the physician
and the patient.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990
(OBRA-90) expanded pharmacists' duties.48 OBRA-90 re-
quires pharmacists to screen prescriptions, to keep a history
of patient records, and to make an offer to discuss proper
drug use with Medicaid patients. Following the mandate of
OBRA, many states applied those duties to all pharmacist-
patient encounters. 49
The Commission to Implement Change in Pharmaceuti-
cal Education (CICPE) articulated pharmacists' increased re-
sponsibilities in the following terms: "the mission of phar-
macy practice is to render pharmaceutical care. Pharmaceuti-
cal care focuses pharmacists' attitudes, behaviors, commit-
ments, concerns, ethics, functions, knowledge, responsibili-
ties and skills on the provision of drug therapy with a goal of
achieving definite outcomes toward the improvement of a
46 See Riff v. Morgan Pharmacy, 508 A.2d 1247 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (find-
ing that pharmacist has a duty to ensure safe prescription fills and refills, as well as
providing safety information and notifying physician if problem perceived).
47 See Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514 (Ind. 1994)
(holding that, based on ordinary negligence principles, a pharmacist had a duty to
refuse to fill a valid prescription for a dangerous, addictive drug when customer
sought refills at an unreasonably fast rate). The court looked to a number of factors
including foreseeability of injury, the nature of the relationship between the pharma-
cist andptient, public policy concerns, and any risk of an increase in cost. See id.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-8(g) (West Supp. 2000) (requiring states to estab-
lish drug use review programs). For a discussion of the pharmacist's duty under
OBRA-90 standards, see Steven W. Huang, The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990:
Redefining Pharmacists' Legal Responsibilities, 14 AM. J.L. & MED. 417, 433-40
(1998); see also David B. Brushwood, The Pharmacist's Dui' Under OBRA-90 Stan-
dards, 18 J. LEGALMED. 475,476 (1997).49See Fleischer, supra note 43, at 169-70.
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patient's quality of life." 50 "Pharmaceutical care directs that
this [achieving desired outcomes] responsibility is to be a
shared obligation between the prescriber and the pharma-
cist."51
Pharmacists' duties exist in the context of the respective
responsibilities of physicians and pharmacists. Legal inter-
pretations have tended to divide these responsibilities into
two broad categories, risk assessment and risk management.
The responsibility for risk assessment falls primarily to the
physician. Physicians must assess the risks and benefits in
prescribing a drug to a patient during each visit and deter-
mine the most appropriate drug treatment. Pharmacists re-
main primarily responsible for risk management. "Risk man-
agement relates to the proper drug use rather than correct
drug choice."
52
The difference between risk management and assessment
is fairly simple. Risk assessment involves a decision by a
doctor about the proper treatment for a patient based on that
patient's individual needs and history. By contrast, risk man-
agement concerns the drug in general and the risks that the
drug presents to any user. Generally, pharmacists are not re-
sponsible for an incorrect risk assessment. 3
The role of the pharmacist continues to change. Both the
law (common law and statutory law) and pharmacy practice
shape this change.54 Although drug choice ultimately remains
with the physician, the pharmacist plays a growing role. In-
50 See American Ass'n of Colleges of Pharmacy, Comm'n to Implement
Change in Pharmaceutical Educ., What is the Mission of Pharmaceutical Education
(1993) at 376, available at <http:ll www.farmacia.us.es/Decanato/Eurofarmal
Euro%20Pharma%2021/AACP.htm> (visited Sept. 12, 2000).
51 Robert L. McCarthy, Health Care Ethics, in INTRODUCTION TO HEALTH
CARE DELIVERY: A PRIMER FOR PHARMAcISTS 355, 361 (Robert L. McCarthy ed.,
1998). 52 ABOOD & BRUSHWOOD, supra note 40, at 212.53 Although, it is even questionable whether a pharmacist was responsible for
risk management under the traditional view of the pharmacist. Furthermore, others
have contended that the pharmacist's responsibility has been misinterpreted by the
courts in various situations. See David B. Brushwood & Larry M. Simonsmeier, Drug
Information for Patients: Duties of the Manufacturer, Pharmacist, Physician, and
Hospital, 7 J. LEGAL MED. 279, 282 (1986). For a good example illustrating the dif-
ference between risk management and risk assessment, see ABOOD & BRUSHWOOD.
supra note 40, at 212-13.
5 See Munger et al., supra note 36, at 888 (noting how courts examine both
laws and pharmacy practice to determine an appropriate standard of care).
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creasingly, clinical pharmacists help develop drug therapy
programs for patients and act as therapeutic consultants. 55
Pharmacists counsel patients with diabetes, hypertension, and
asthma.56 They may instruct patients on the function and use
of devices associated with their prescribed treatments. For
example, pharmacists can review proper inhaler use for pa-
tients with asthma or syringe use and disposal for diabetics.
As pharmacists take on greater responsibilities, the duty of
the pharmacist will also continue to change. In this period of
change, however, little consensus exists across geographic
areas as to the scope of pharmacists' legal duties.
2. Defining ethical duties in new situations: Should
pharmacists fill syringe prescriptions for IDUs?
Under the pharmacist's traditional role, a pharmacist
would merely have to fill the prescription as given. As the
role of the pharmacist has changed, so too have the ethical
and legal obligations become more complex. Pharmacists ex-
ercise a greater degree of control and bear a greater responsi-
bility than ever before. Yet, although the majority of pharma-
cists in various surveys have expressed support for over-the-
counter sales of syringes in general, far fewer are enthusiastic
about selling to IDUs. In areas of first impression (such as
syringe prescribing), where no clear definition exists as to the
pharmacist's duty, an examination of the official statements
of professional organizations, as well as existing codes of
' See generally Amy Broeseker & Kristin Kar Janke, The Evolution and
Revolution of Pharmaceutical Care, in INTRODUCTION TO HEALTH CARE DELIVERY: A
PRIMER FOR PHARMACISTS 393,401-03 (Robert L. McCarthy ed., 1998).
- See Hurd & Levin, supra note 41, 175-76 (indicating that pharmacy can
increase its public activity by counseling patients about diseases).57 See T. Stephen Jones & Jennifer Taussig, Should Pharmacists Sell Sterile
Syringes to Injection Drug Users?, 39 J. AM. PHARMACEUnCAL ASS'N 8 (1999) (re-
porting that pharmacists are divided in their support of the sale of syringes to intrave-
nous drug users); see also Thomas A. Parley et al., Attitudes and Practices of Phar-
macy Managers Regarding Needle Sales to Injection Drug Users, 39 J. AM.
PHARMACErTiCAL ASS'N 23, 23-26 (1999); Alice A. Gleghom et al., Pharmacists'
Attitudes About Pharmacy Sale of Needles/Syringes and Needle Exchange Programs
in a Cit.y Without Needle/Syringe Prescription Laws, 18 J. AcQuIR. IMMUNE D'FIc.
SYNDR. & HUM. RETROVIROLOGY S89 (Supp. 11998); Linda Wright-De Aguero et
al., Impact of the Change in Connecticut Syringe Prescription Laws on Pharmacy
Sales and Pharmacy Managers' Practices, 18 J. AcQuIR. IMMUNE DEFIC. SYNDR. &
HUM. RETROVIROLOGY S102, S108-09 (Supp. 1 1998) (explaining the reasons why
pharmacists are unwilling to sell to IDUs).
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ethics and legal concepts of duty and liability, helps define
the pharmacists' ethical and legal duties.
In late 1999, leaders of the American Medical Associa-
tion (AMA), the American Pharmaceutical Association
(APhA), the Association of State and Territorial Health Offi-
cials (ASTHO), and the National Alliance of State and Ter-
ritorial AIDS Directors (NASTAD) issued a joint statement
calling for the coordinated efforts of state leaders in phar-
macy, public health, and medicine to address access to sterile
syringes as a means of preventing further transmission of
blood-borne infections. For instance, the "APhA encourages
state legislatures and boards of pharmacy to revise laws and
regulations to permit the unrestricted sale or distribution of
sterile syringes and needles by or with the knowledge of a
pharmacist in an effort to decrease the transmission of blood-
borne diseases. 5 8 Where the law permits sales of syringes
without a prescription, or can be interpreted to allow sales to
IDUs with prescriptions, APhA's position supports pharma-
cists dispensing syringes.
The pharmacists' professional code also provides relevant
guidance. This code obliges pharmacists to put the health
needs of their patients first.59 Medical decisions, including
the potential benefits of access to sterile syringes, should be
made based on objective scientific criteria. Thus, if the pre-
ponderance of the evidence from well-designed scientific
studies indicates probable health benefits and low risks,
pharmacists ought to honor prescriptions for syringes.
The risk assessment/risk management model is somewhat
outdated in the era of expanding pharmaceutical practice and
duties. Using it, however, would not contradict the result
suggested by either of these approaches. Applying the risk
assessment/risk management model, the pharmacists' role
would be limited to complete and accurate instruction in how
to use the prescribed treatment, in this case, syringes. Phar-
macists could provide information on safe injection practices,
disposal of needles, and means to access drug treatment. The
risk assessment/risk management approach also suggests
S Report of the APhA House of Delegates: Actions of the Official Legislative
Body of the American Pharmaceutical Association, 39 J. AM. PHARMACEUTICAL
Ass'N 447,447 (1999).
59 See American Pharm. Ass'n, supra note 41.
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pharmacists should sell syringes. Where syringes are validly
prescribed, and there are no absolute risk management con-
traindications to their use, the pharmacist would assume that
a physician has already assessed the situation and determined
that the benefits of prescribing syringes in this situation out-
weigh the risks. In this context, the pharmacist's duty is to
sell the syringes, and to manage their proper use through pa-
tient education.
Even where legislatures have modified laws to permit
over-the-counter sale of syringes, pharmacies (and pharma-
cists) still have the option of whether to sell syringes without
a prescription. After Connecticut changed its law to permit
the limited sale of syringes over-the-counter, a questionnaire
to 15 pharmacies in New Haven found that four had policies
against the sale of syringes without a prescription.6 Thirteen
of 18 pharmacies in Hartford allowed the sale of syringes
without a prescription.61 By contrast, in pharmacies on the
periphery of Hartford, only five of nine pharmacies allowed
the sale of syringes without a prescription.62 One pharmacist
responded that he suspected that most, if not all of the phar-
macists that work the day shift, only sell syringes with a pre-
scription.63 Thus, deregulation alone does not necessarily
guarantee that IDUs will have access to syringes without a
physician's prescription. Conversely, even where the law
does not require a prescription, pharmacists may be more
willing to sell an IDU syringes with a prescription (which
implies a physician's endorsement of a legitimate medical
purpose) than to sell syringes over-the-counter.
Pharmacists dispensing syringes based on prescriptions
have ample support for their actions in the position state-
ments of their national professional body, ethical codes, and
even a relatively conservative interpretation of the pharma-
cist's role. Some might even suggest these materials create an
obligation to dispense syringes to prescription-holding IDUs
in the absence of specific reasons to believe that the pre-
scription would be harmful.
6o See Merrill Singer et al., Pharmacy Access to Syringes Among Injecting
Drug Users: Follow-up Findings from Hartford, CT, 113 PuB. HEALTH REp. 81, 82
(Supp. 11998).
61 See id. at 84.
62 See id.
6. See id. at 85.
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C. Why Some Physicians and Pharmacists Might Refuse to
Treat IDUs
Physicians may feel ill-prepared for treating IDUs and
perceive few positive reasons for involvement with them.
IDU patients can be difficult and demanding. Their medical
problems are complicated by their need for social services,
that may include drug treatment, housing, counseling, assis-
tance with parenting, child care, and ultimately job training.
Most regular physicians' offices are not equipped to provide
this level of intensive intervention and support, so IIDUs who
are patients may not ever get the support they need to quit
using injection drugs. Additionally IDU patients present in-
terpersonal challenges. 64
When physicians do treat IDUs, they may be so wary of
encouraging drug use that they may not provide the care the
patient needs to treat an underlying illness. Physicians are
particularly hesitant to prescribe narcotics to IDUs, or former
IDUs, even when such treatment is warranted by conditions
known to cause pain. Physicians may also refuse to provide
other forms of treatment due to fears that the treatment will
facilitate continued drug use.65
Pharmacists may avoid selling syringes to IDUs for rea-
sons of safety, or fear of harming their businesses. Common
concerns expressed by pharmacists are that having IDUs as
customers will drive away other customers, that IDUs will
commit crimes in and around the pharmacy, or that they will
discard their used needles and syringes nearby.66 The reluc-
tance of physicians and pharmacists to interact with IDUs
results in reduced access to health care and pharmacy serv-
ices for IDUs, who already receive less care than the majority
population.
67
Additionally, physicians and pharmacists may morally
oppose an IDU's drug use or other illegal activities, or be
personally repelled by the IDU's affect or daily life. Sepa-
64 See generally PETER A. SELWYN, SUIRVIVINO THE FALL: THE PERSONAL
JOURNEY OFAN AIDS DOCTOR (1998).65 See Brennan, supra note 33, at 148 (illustrating how physicians treating an
IDU patient declined to use a "central line," fearing that it would provide an easy port
for injecting illegal drugs).
66See Wright-De Aguero et al., supra note 57, at S105-09; see also Gleghorn
et al., supra note 57, at S92.
. See discussion infra Parts ILA.3 and II.B.2.
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rating professional ethical duties from personal responses
may be necessary for some professionals to care for IDUs
regularly.
M. THE ROLES OF LAW IN THE DEBATE OVER
PRESCRIBINGIDISPENSING SYRINGES
A. The Relationship Between Law and Ethics
Ethical values and legal principles are usually closely
related, but ethical obligations typically exceed legal duties.
In some cases, the law mandates unethical conduct. In gen-
eral, when physicians believe a law is unjust, they should
work to change the law. In exceptional circumstances of un-
just laws, ethical responsibilities should supersede legal obli-
gations.68
The law influences ethical analysis in at least two ways.
First, in many situations, legal analysis of physician liability
establishes the physician's legal duty in a particular case."
Although legal duties are not always dispositive of ethical
duties in a particular situation, the law usually establishes the
minimum quality of action acceptable to society. In these
cases, the law may provide the floor, while ethics describe
the normative goal or ideal.
Second, however, the law may pose a structural barrier to
ethical conduct. In these cases the tension between law and
ethics may create an ethical dilemma for physicians, whether
to fulfill their duties to patients and break the law, or to obey
"' AMERICAN MED. Ass'N, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUD. AFFAIRS, CODE OF
MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS, § 1.02 (1998).
69 The law has defined a physician's general duty towards his patients as a
"duty to use reasonable care and diligence in the exercise of his skill and the applica-
tion of his learning ... to use his best judgment in exercising his skill and applying
his knowledge." TOM CHRISTOFFEL, HEALTH AND THE LAW: A HANDBOOK FOR
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 309 (1982) (citing Pike v. Honsinger, 49 N.E. 760, 762
(N.Y. 1898). But see Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal.
1976) (stating that "legal duties are not discoverable of nature, but merely conclusory
expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage
done"). In determining whether a legal duty existed in Tarasoff, the justices stated
that "[a] physician may not reveal the confidence entrusted to him in the course of
medical attendance... unless he is required to do so by law or unless it becomes
necessary in order to protect the welfare of the individual or of the community." 14 at
347 (quoting the AMERICAN MED. ASS'N, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9
(1957)).
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the law and leave some obligations unfulfilled. Both of these
issues, the standard of care and the physician's options, when
faced with legal barriers, will be covered below.
Law plays a significant role in discussions of duty, which
also occupies much of the dialogue about ethics. This section
reviews three ways in which the law affects determinations of
physicians' and pharmacists' ethical duty, establishment of a
standard of care, and duty to third parties, in addition to the law
as a barrier to actions which physicians or pharmacists feel are
ethically justified.
B. The Standard of Care
A legal determination of the standard of care often
frames the discussion about the physician's and pharmacist's
obligation with respect to his or her patients, and provides a
minimum threshold for ethical duties. Yet, because the stan-
dard of care continuously evolves, it may be difficult to de-
termine in new situations. Ultimately, only a court or a jury
can determine whether physicians' and pharmacists' actions
comply with the standard of care. Nonetheless, we can ex-
amine factors that are used in establishing the standard of
care in order to determine how a court might analyze a situa-
tion. These factors include: the reasonable practitioner stan-
dard, customary practice, practice guidelines, a respectable
minority position, new developments in the field (scientific,
medical, technical), the limitations of self-regulation, and
whether a professional or ordinary standard of care applies.
1. A professional standard of care
As a general rule, physicians must exercise reasonable care
comparable to that expected of other physicians of similar skill,
training, and education. 70 Expert witnesses testify in court as to
what a reasonable physician would do. Although community
standards have historically played an important role in estab-
lishing the applicable standard of care, increasingly, courts rely
on a national standard.7 1 Ultimately, a jury determines the stan-
dard of care based on the evidence introduced.
70See CHRISTOFFEL, supra note 69.
71 See generally DAViD M. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ch. 21 (3d ed.
1993 & Supp. 1998) (discussing standards of care for conduct of medical practitio-
ners).
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Health care professionals make decisions everyday based
on multiple factors, including the facts of the particular case,
the caregiver's perceived duties, and the patient's perceived
needs, personal preferences for treatment, knowledge of new
scientific evidence, and willingness to act. In much of medical
care, when there are different treatments available, "the choice
between them is usually based on value judgments, not medical
judgments. ' 2 Some patterns of choices become codified as part
of "customary practice," which helps establish the standard of
care.73 While the customary practice is not determinative, it
plays an important role in establishing the reasonableness of the
physician's actions.
Physicians have a duty to keep up to date with progress in
their fields and to use their "best judgment" in making deci-
sions. This duty includes knowing the latest research regarding
drugs, techniques, and procedures in their specialty. 74 In these
cases, custom does not protect a physician from liability.
Practice guidelines also play a role in the formation of the
standard of care. The admission of a guideline into evidence,
however, does not compel the court to accept the guideline as
72 Alexander M. Capron & Vicki Michel, Law and Bioethics, 27 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 25,36 (1993).
7
"This deference to the profession is partly due to the courts' "reluctance to
overburden [the medical profession] with liability based on uneducated judgment."
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 189
(5 h ed. 1984). It is also suggested that courts may want to avoid a legal standard of
care "because of the potential physical and economic harm to patients caused by
legally-defensible but inferior or unsafe medicine" (specifically, there is concern that
medical progress would slow), see Margaret Lent, Note, The Medical and Legal
Risks of the Electronic Fetal Monitor, 51 STAN. L. REV. 807, 827 (1999).
74 In fact, courts have recognized this duty. See, e.g., Burton v. Brooklyn
Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879-80 (1982) (finding physician liable for mal-
practice for failing to consider recent studies questioning accepted medical practice);
Toth v. Community Hosp. at Glen Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368, 373 (N.Y. 1968) (holding
that physicians are required to use their best judgment irrespective of contrary custom
or practice); Morgan v. Sheppard, 188 N.E.2d 808 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963) (ruling on
multiple assignments of error and holding that a physician who performed a surgical
procedure must exercise the same degree of care that an ordinarily prudent person in
the same profession would have exercised under similar circumstances); Incollingo v.
Ewing, 282 A.2d 206 (Pa. 1971) (holding the standard in a malpractice action, that
physician did not possess or employ the required skill and knowledge, is qualified by
the advanced state of the profession at the time of the treatment), vacated on other
grounds, 421 A.2d 1027 (Pa. 1980) (abandoning the Incollingo determination for
damages).
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the appropriate standard of care.75 Courts still depend on expert
testimony to establish the relevance of the practice guidelines.
76
Ultimately, courts may find other evidence more persuasive of
the standard of care.77
However, even where customary practice or practice
guidelines exist, there are times when a physician could utilize
more than one treatment option. Courts allow for a "respectable
minority" rule which permits physicians to choose between ac-
ceptable treatments without fear of facing liability if the chosen
treatment does not work.
78
Leaving aside for now how courts might consider criminal
provisions as they conflict with a possible standard of care, we
can apply these various determinants of a professional standard
of care to the issue of physicians prescribing syringes to IDUs.
The most problematic aspect of an argument for prescribing sy-
ringes as the standard of care is customary practice. The vast
majority of physicians currently caring for IDUs do not pre-
scribe syringes. These physicians may not know their patients
use injection drugs, or be unaware of HIV risk, or assume that
such a prescription would be invalid or violate medical practice
acts.
75 See Paul D. Rheingold & Thomas P. Valet, Practice Parameters: New
Standardsfor Medical Care?, TRIAL, May 1993, at 56, 57.76 See Gary W. Kuc, Comment, Practice Parameters as a Shield Against Phy-
sician Liability, 10 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 439, 463 (1994) (discussing
how statements made by medical experts and recorded in learned treatises are an
exception to the hearsay rule).
77 See Edward B. Hirshfeld, Should Practice Parameters Be the Standard of
Care in Malpractice Litigation?, 266 JAMA 2886 (1991) (noting evidence contrary
to medical practice parameters may be considered if the court finds the other evi-
dence more persuasive as to the standard of care).
') See, e.g., Sprowl v. Ward, 441 So.2d 898 (Alaska 1983) (holding evidence
of alternative treatments admissible if both commonly accepted modes of treatment);
Roberts v. Tardif, 417 A.2d 444, 451-52 (Me. 1980) (requiring physicians to be held
to a national standard of care); Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82 (Me. 1974). There
are a couple of variations to the respectable minority rule that courts have utilized.
Compare Fritz v. Parke Davis & Co., 152 N.W.2d 129 (Minn. 1967), and Gresham v.
Ford, 241 S.W.2d 408 (Tenn. 1951) (expressing approval of a variation of the "re-
spectable minority" rule by finding that a treatment approved by a considerable num-
ber of physicians is acceptable), with Rickett v. Hayes, 511 S.W.2d 187 (Ark. 1974)
(holding that when reasonable physicians merely disagree as to proper treatment,
negligence is not proven) and Haase v. Garfinkel, 418 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. 1967) (find-
ing that when reasonable physicians disagree as to a proper course of treatment, a
physician may choose to use one type of treatment over another without liability).
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Existing law provides little guidance here. Courts have in-
terpreted medical practice acts to invalidate prescriptions for
narcotics to IDUs for the purpose of maintaining their habits.79
Although no court has addressed whether similar reasoning
should be applied to the prescription of syringes, decisions re-
lated to prescribing controlled substances have been used (per-
haps erroneously) to suggest that a prescription for syringes for
an IDU to prevent blood-borne diseases would be invalid. Al-
though customary practice does not support prescribing, it
should not be determinative in light of the substantial evidence
regarding public health guidelines, new developments, and the
views of the respectable minority which support a new or
evolving standard of care.
Practice guidelines, the practices of a respectable minority,
and new developments in the field provide the strongest evi-
dence for prescribing syringes as the standard of care. Public
health and clinical authorities endorse physicians recommend-
ing that IDUs use sterile syringes for each injection.80 Where no
legal access to syringes exists, these recommendations would
seem to support physician prescribing to IDUs who fit all other
criteria (who have been counseled to stop using, enter treat-
ment, or stop injecting, but cannot or will not currently.)
Some physicians experienced in treating JiDUs and per-
sons with HIV want to prescribe syringes but fear legal con-
sequences.8' Others have actually begun pilot programs for
IDUs in states with syringe prescription laws.8 2 A respectable
71 See People v. Goldberg, 369 N.Y.S.2d 989 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975). "It is clear
that a doctor who issues a prescription or dispenses controlled substances for non-
medical purposes is not acting 'in the course of his professional practice only."' Id. at
991.
w See HELENE D. GAYLE Er AL, HIV PREVENTION BULLETIN: MEDICAL
ADVICE FOR PERSONS WHO INJECT ILLICIT DRUGS (U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum.
Serv., May 9. 1997); American Med. Ass'n, A Physician Guide to HIV Prevention
(1996), available at <http:lwww.ama-assn.orglspeciallhivltreatmntlguidelhivguidel
hivguide.htm> (visited Sept. 27, 2000); REPORT OF THE U.S. PREVENTIVE SERVICES
TASK FORCE, GUIDE TO CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES 591(2d ed. 1996); PANEL ON
NEEDLE EXCH. & BLEACH DIsTRIB. PROGRAMS, supra note 7, at 253-54; REPORT: THE
TWIN EPIDEMICS OF SUBSTANCE USE AND HIV (Nat'l Comm'n on AIDS, Wash.
D.C.), July 1991, at 10 (recommending that legal barriers placed on IDU's access to
sterile syringes be removed).
See Lazzarini et al., supra note 8.
82 See Scott Burris et al., Physician Prescribing of Sterile Injection Equipment
to Prevent H7 Inifection: Time for Action, 133 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 218, 223
(2000).
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minority view arguably already supports physician prescrib-
ing. Additionally, the overwhelming weight of empirical evi-
dence collected and analyzed in recent years suggests a po-
tential public health benefit from access to sterile syringes for
IDUs to protect against HIV infection.83
Given that public health and clinical authorities endorse the
idea that IDUs use sterile syringes for each injection (for clini-
cal and public health reasons), an evolving standard of care that
includes physicians prescribing syringes is a reasonable option
that comports with scientific evidence.
2. An ordinary standard of care
Despite the courts' marked deference to professional opin-
ions regarding the standard of care, professional self-regulation
cannot be completely unfettered. Complete professional discre-
tion for setting the standard of care gives a profession the op-
portunity to shield itself (perhaps unfairly) from liability:
[A] whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adop-
tion of new and available devices. It never may set its
own tests, however persuasive be its usages. Courts
must in the end say what is required; there are precau-
tions so imperative that even their universal disregard
will not excuse their omission.
8 4
Courts will also consider professional responsibility in
the context of an ordinary standard of care. A professional
standard is not absolute, nor does it exist in a vacuum. The
foundation of the ordinary standard of care is the duty to
adopt reasonable behaviors and precautions that minimize
resulting perils and dangers.85 Ordinary care mandates that
persons of ordinary prudence utilize care to prevent injury to
themselves or others under circumstances similar to those at
83 See PANEL ON NEEDLE EXCH. & BLEACH DISTRIE. PROGRAMS, supra note 7,
at 253; see also I SCHOOL OF PUB. HEALTH, UNiv. OF CAL., BERKELEY & INST. FOR
HEALTH POL'Y STUD., UNIV. OF CAL., SAN FRANCISCO, THE PUBLIC HEALTH IMPACT
OFNEEDLEEXCHANGEPROGRAMS INTHE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD 20-21 (1993).
84The T.L Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (finding tugboat company
liable for loss of cargo, regardless of industry standards, for not having their tugs
equipped with radio receivers).
85 See Adams v. Bullock, 125 N.E. 93 (N.Y. 1919).
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issue.86 Defining the ordinary standard of care in any situa-
tion requires two steps: (1) calculating the risk, and (2) es-
tablishing what a reasonably prudent person would do.87
To calculate risk, courts often turn to Judge Learned
Hand's formula for an economic theory of negligence. Using
this formula, B<pL formula,88 the burden (B) of taking the
necessary precautions is weighed against the injury (L) mul-
tiplied by the probability (p) that the injury will occur.8 9
Where the cost of preventing the risk is less than the product
of the cost of the injury and its probability, the defendant is
liable.90 Although Hand's formula functions well in theory,
applying it to real world situations may be more problematic.
Difficulties arise when courts or juries attempt to set mone-
tary values on personal injuries and the costs of prevention.91
Juries may make judgments founded on reasonableness rather
than by balancing costs.
The ordinary standard of care also demands the evalua-
tion of what a "reasonably prudent person" would do in like
circumstances. This legal fiction compares the defendant's
behavior with that of a reasonably prudent person in order to
determine negligence. A reasonable person is defined as one
who adheres to the general standard of behavior in the com-
munity, or who possesses the average level of moral judg-
ment in the community.
"6 See MARK A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTER-
NATIVES 34 (6 th ed. 1996).17 See generally id. (describing method of conveying concept of "reasonable
care" to a jury).
SSee United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d. Cir. 1947)
(discussing the formula to determine an individual's duty to protect against injury
when assessing negligent conduct).
89 See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-
33 (1972) (explaining Judge Learned Hand's formula for calculating risk and the
economic theory of negligence).
" See Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974), reaff4 Gates v. Jensen,
595 P.2d 919 (Wash. 1979) (holding the decision not superceded by state statute). In
Helling, a woman lost part of her vision due to glaucoma and sued her ophthalmolo-
gist for malpractice. At the time, the professional standard provided that patients
under the age of 40 were not tested for glaucoma. This standard was challenged and
the Supreme Court of Washington found in Helling's favor, since the test was very
simple and inexpensive to administer whereas the disease was potentially blinding.
Thus, the benefits of the test clearly outweighed the costs of administering it.
9 See generally McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554 (7 1h Cir. 1987)(explaining the difficulty in determining monetary value of personal injuries).
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In determining the standard of care for physicians treat-
ing IDUs at risk for contracting HIV and other blood-borne
diseases, we can apply an ordinary negligence standard util-
izing a cost-benefit analysis. Different variables contribute to
this analysis: (1) the nature of the injury, (2) the probability
of the injury, and (3) the costs of preventing the injury. The
nature of the injury, when IDUs are infected with blood-
borne diseases, remains serious. Although recent advances in
anti-retroviral therapy have lengthened survival, HIV infec-
tion remains incurable, and finally fatal. Infections with
hepatitis B or C, though less deadly, are more common and
cause substantial illness and death in a proportion of patients.
The probability of injury-in this case, the probability
that an IDU will contract HIV or another blood-borne infec-
tion by sharing needles-can be derived from national AIDS
data. At the end of June 1999, 36% of the 711,344 AIDS
cases reported from July 1998 to June 1999 were directly or
indirectly associated with injection drug use.92 Furthermore,
estimates indicate that up to 90% of IDUs are infected with
hepatitis C.9 3 These numbers show that IDUs are at great risk
of blood-borne diseases, and represent a significant propor-
tion of those who contract HIV. Finally, a cost-benefit analy-
sis must determine the burden of taking the necessary pre-
cautions to prevent the injury. Recommendations state that
people who inject drugs should use sterile syringes to prevent
the transmission of HIV and other blood-borne diseases. 94
From an economic perspective, it costs approximately
$195,188 to treat an HIV-infected person for a lifetime. In
92 See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, HIV/AIDS Surveillance
Report: Midyear Edition, Vol. I1, No. 1, Table 5 (1999). Available at
<www.cdc.gov/hiv/stats/hasrlink.htm> (visited Sept. 12,2000) (citing AIDS cases by
age, exposure category, and sex).
93 See Miriam J. Alter & Linda A. Moyer, The Importance of Preventing
Hepatitis C Virus Infection Among Injection Drug Users in the United States, 18 J.
ACQuIR. IMMuNE DEFIC. SYNDR. & HUM. REhOVIROLOGY S6 (Supp. 11998).
94 See Report of the APhA, supra note 58 (stating the APhA's formal position
encouraging the revision of state laws to permit the unrestricted sale or distribution of
sterile syringes); see also George D. Lundberg, New Winds Blowing for American
Drug Policies, 278 JAMA 946 (1997) (indicating the AMA recommends the use of
sterile syringe programs for prevention of HIV infection); GAYLE Er AL., supra note
80, at 3; American Med. Ass'n, supra note 80; REPORT OF THE U.S. PREVeNMIVE
SERVICES TASK FORCE, supra note 80, at 727; PANEL ON NEEDLE ExcH. & BLEACH
DISTRIB. PROGRAMS, supra note 7, at 251-53; REPORT: Tim TWIN EPIDEMICS OF
SuBSTANCE USE AND AIDS, supra note 80, at 10.
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1992, the median annual budget for running a SEP was
$169,000. Using these data, it costs approximately $9,400 to
prevent each new case of HIV infection among SEP clients,
their sex partners, and children (where the government or
private organization bears the cost of the SEP). 9 Studies in-
dicate that IDUs could bear much of the cost of this type of
"prevention," as most were willing to pay ten times the
wholesale cost of syringes and none were unwilling to pay at
all.96
Providing IDUs access to syringes costs relatively little
compared with the cost of treating patients with HIV infection.
Syringe exchange programs cost the most, but considerably less
than the lifetime cost for EILV infection. Over-the-counter sales
or prescription sales of syringes cost even less. The most direct
means to prevent HIV among IDUs is to get them to stop using
drugs. Persuading IDUs to stop using drugs may not always be
possible, 97 even when treatment is available.18 As a conse-
quence, physicians may justifiably seek reasonable alternatives
to protect IDUs and the public health.
Thus, considering the B<pL formula (using the data on ad-
diction, drug treatment, and the probable benefits of access to
9 See SCHOOL OF PUB. HEALTH, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY & INST. FOR
HEALTH POLICY STuDIss, UNIV. OF CAL., SAN FRANCISCO, supra note 83, at 21 (esti-
mating that prevention of HIV costs $9,400 per HIV infection avoided).
96 See Benjamin Junge et al., Pharmacy Access to Sterile Syringes for Injec-
tion Drug Users: Attitudes of Participants in a Syringe Exchange Program, 39 J. AM.
PHARMACEUTICAL ASS'N 17, 21 (1999). In this study examining pharmacy access to
sterile syringes, respondents said they would pay a mean sum of $0.80 per syringe at
a pharmacy (including a range from $0.10 to $4.00) and no one said that they would
not pay anything for syringes at the pharmacy. See generally Alice A. Gleghorn et al.,
Acquisition and Use of Needles and Syringes by Injecting Drug Users in Baltimore,
Mar'land, 10 J. ACQUIR. IMMUNE DEFIC. SYNDR. & HUM. RETROVIROLOGY 97
(1995).
97 See John K. Watters, A Street-based Outreach Model of AIDS Prevention
for Intravenous Drug Users: Preliminary Evaluation, 14 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS.
411, 422 (1987) (discussing how 15 years of increased treatment options have not
abated drug use); see also Joyce F. Jackson et al., A Coupon Program - Drug Treat-
ment and AIDS Education, 24 INT'L J. ADDICTIONS 1035 (1989) (finding treatment
program location, age, sex, and origin to be significant predictors for continuation in
heroin treatment program).
98 See James A. Wiley & Michael C. Samuel, Prevalence of HIV Infection in
the USA, 3 AIDS S71, S72 (Supp. 11989) (discussing that there are often not enough
adequate drug treatment centers available to those who want to seek such services).
Treatment centers often have long waiting lists making access difficult. At any given
time, less than 15% of IDUs are in treatment on a given day. See id.
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sterile syringes), the ordinary standard of care analysis suggests
that a relatively low burden intervention, such as prescribing
syringes to IDUs under specific circumstances, ought to be an
option, if not an obligation, of physicians.
3. Conclusions from a standard of care analysis
In summary, both ordinary and professional standards of
care support prescribing syringes to IDUs to prevent blood-
borne infections. Substantial evidence supports the argument
that the standard of care should include educating patients on
safe injection and access to syringes through either SEPs or
prescription.99 Where the law provides no other legal access
to syringes (syringe prescription and/or drug paraphernalia
laws in force, and no SEPs), expert medical testimony could
show that the proper standard of care is to prescribe needles
to known IDUs. As discussed, practice guidelines are not
dispositive, but can be introduced as evidence as to the
proper standard of care. The AMA, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, and the National Commission on
AIDS have recommend the use of clean needles and syringes
for IDUs.1°° Some physicians may already participate in SEPs
or even supply needles to their patients.
C. Duty to Third Parties
Issues of legal duty may extend to others beyond the
doctor-patient or pharmacist-patient relationship. Important
questions about the physician's (or pharmacist's) potential
duty include:10 1 (1) Does the physician have a duty to protect
those who share injection equipment with their IDU pa-
tients?, (2) If so, how can the physician satisfy this duty (by
educating patients on the correct use of sterile syringes, by
providing prescriptions for sterile syringes, or by directly
warning the third party of the potential risk)?, and (3) Does
the physician have a duty to protect third parties by not pro-
viding syringes, and thus not providing the instrumentality
that could cause harm to others if used incorrectly?
99 See PANEL ON NEEDLE EXCH. & BLEACH DISTRIB. PROGRAMS, supra note 7,
at 251-53.
100 See supra note 94.
101 This section will focus on the application to physicians, although similar
reasoning, if not law, may be applied to pharmacists.
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Generally, an individual has no duty to control the con-
duct of another or to warn third parties who are in danger as a
result of such conduct. Aside from a possible moral obliga-
tion, there is no legal duty to help another in danger. 02 A
duty to prevent harm or to warn of the risk of harm, however,
may arise out of a special relationship, such as the physician-
patient or therapist-patient-relationship described in Tarasoff
v. Regents of the University of California. 103
In Tarasoff, the court held that when a therapist is aware
that a patient poses a danger to a foreseeable third party, she
must take reasonable measures to warn or protect that third
party10 4 Preventing the danger the patient poses to others
justifies the resulting breach of the confidential relationship
between the therapist and patient. Tarasoff reaffirmed that the
physician-patient relationship can create positive duties to
third parties, and established a common law duty to take
steps to protect (to warn or to warn others who might protect)
'o2 See Cairl v. State, 323 N.W.2d 20 (Minn. 1982) (holding that there is only
a duty to warn when specific threats are made against specific victims); Williams v.
Sun Valley Hosp., 723 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a hospital does
not have a blanket responsibility over its patients and has no duty to protect third
parties from unpredictable behavior); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 73, § 30, at
375 (discussing the expert swimmer who sees another person drowning has no duty
to help the person).
'
0o See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 343-45 (Cal. 1976)
(finding psychotherapist liable to warn others of dangers posed by a patient). The
Tarasoff court relied on the comments to section 319 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. Id. at 343 (referencing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 315-19 (1965)).
The first illustration of section 319 describes a hospital that negligently fails to diag-
nose or treat properly a patient with a communicable disease. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 cmt. a, illus. 1 (1965). The second illustration describes a
hospital that negligently allows a delirious smallpox patient to escape. See id., cmt. a,
illus. 2. Since the hospital failed in its duty to its patient, the consequences of that
failure extended the risk to foreseeable others.
104 Most jurisdictions have adopted this doctrine in some form. Some courts
limit a Tarasoff-type duty to situations in which the victim is readily identifiable. See
Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993) (holding a therapist owes a
duty to third parties when a patient is a likely danger to an individual or a distinct
group of individuals). In fact, in most cases that follow Tarasoff, the tendency is to
limit the duty to a third party to those who are readily identifiable. California has a
statute that limits liability of therapists to only identifiable and foreseeable third par-
ties; see also Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92(a) (West 2000). But see Hamman v. County of
Maricopa, 775 P.2d 1122 (Ariz. 1989) (finding that a psychiatrist's duty to warn third
persons is not limited to those third persons who have been targets of direct threats,
but also includes foreseeable victims who are subject to risk as a result of a patient's
conduct; vacating Court of Appeal's opinion in part and remanding for further pro-
ceedings).
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an identifiable third party of dangers that a physician knew or
should have known were posed by a particular patient. A duty
to third parties may require disclosure of otherwise confiden-
tial information to third parties, or it may merely mandate the
disclosure of information, about the risks, directly to the pa-
tient.
In the context of communicable diseases, some cases have
imposed a positive duty on physicians to protect third parties
from a patient's communicable disease, particularly when the
physician failed to warn the patient or the regular sex partner of
the patient. 0 5 A physician may breach this duty by failing to
inform the patient of exposure to or diagnosis of a communica-
ble disease, by failing to warn the patient of the dangers associ-
ated with the communicable disease, or by giving erroneous ad-
vice to the patient.1 6 Inadequate care of the patient amounts to a
breach of duty and causes a danger to third parties.10
7
No cases have imposed a similar duty on physicians in re-
lation to syringe-sharing partners of IDUs. Current public pre-
ventive care guidelines recommend that physicians should
105 See DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester County, Inc., 559 A.2d 530, 534
(Pa. 1989). But see Lawrence 0. Gostin, et al., Legislative Survey of State Confiden-
tiality Laws, with Specific Emphasis on HIV and Immunization (Final Report pre-
sented to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, the Council of State &
Territorial Epidemiologists, and the Task Force for Child Survival-Carter Presiden-
tial Center, 1997). Most state statutes governing HIV-related information do not im-
pose a duty to warn third parties of potential exposure. Instead, HIV-statutes usually
shield physicians or health departments from liability for failure to warn and permit
them to warn sex or needle-sharing partners only when certain conditions are met.
See id.
"6 See DiMarco, 559 A.2d at 534; see also Myers v. Quesenberry, 144 Cal.
App. 3d 888 (1983) (holding that a physician has a duty to take reasonable steps to
protect foreseeable victims of patient's dangerous contact). This has occurred in at
least one AIDS related case, see Reisner v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d
518, 522 (CL App. 1995) (finding physician liable for not warning the third party
victim to take precautionary measures). In this case, a young girl contracted HIV
through a blood transfusion, and her physician did not inform her that she had was
infected with HIV. A few years later, her boyfriend became infected and sued.
107 In these situations, the existence of a third party is presumed. See Gooden
v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. App. 1983) (commenting that jurisdictions outside of
Texas have allowed third parties to bring causes of action against a physician for the
physician's negligent treatment of a patient and holding that it was inappropriate to
grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment). Thus, the physician has a duty
to provide reasonable care in order to protect family members. See Shepard v. Red-
ford Community Hosp., 390 N.W.2d 239 (Mich. C. App. 1986) (holding that al-
though a medical specialist is held to a "national standard of care," lack of supplies
and equipment locally may justify differences in treatment).
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counsel IDU patients to stop using drugs or adopt safe injection
practices. These guidelines suggest that the standard of care
may soon include a duty to adequately inform IDU patients of
the risk of transmission via contaminated syringes, and to coun-
sel IDUs on how to avoid infection through safe injection prac-
tices. The guidelines present a weaker argument for an affirma-
tive duty to assist IDUs to obtain sterile syringes. The guide-
lines provide no support for the proposition that physicians have
a duty to protect third parties by refusing to prescribe. Physician
refusal to prescribe is neither necessary nor sufficient to protect
IDUs' partners and may actually increase their risk of harm by
increasing the risk that IDUs will use contaminated syringes.
When caring for IDUs, physicians may satisfy any duty
to third parties by informing the patient of the risk of trans-
mission and a reasonable means to avoid transmission (i.e.,
use of sterile syringes and condoms.) When IDUs have no
legal access to syringes, physicians could ethically choose to
prescribe syringes, in part, to protect the patient's sexual and
needle-sharing partners and children from possible future in-
fection.
D. Responses to Otherwise Prohibited Acts: Civil
Disobedience and Medical Necessity
"A physician shall respect the law and also recognize a
responsibility to seek changes in those requirements which
are contrary to the best interests of the patient."' 8 A physi-
cian's duty extends beyond providing care for his or her pa-
tient. Physicians should work to change laws that are con-
trary to the best interests of their patients. 0 9 "Professional
ethical responsibilities exist beyond statute and may require
defiance of the statute."110 Thus, not only should a physician
assist IDUs in accessing sterile syringes, but they should also
work to change the laws that restrict access.
When faced with an apparently unjust law or one that con-
flicts with their ethical obligations, public health goals, or per-
sonal morals, physicians may quietly comply with the law, work
1'8 AM. MED. ASS'N, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUD. AFFAIRS, supra note 68.
at xiv.
109 See id.
110 ROBERT HUNT SPRINKLE, PROFESSION OF CONSCIENCE: THE MAKING AND
MEANING OF LIFE-SCIENCES LIBERALISM 115 (1994).
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to change it, or break the law in order to achieve some higher
goal. When physicians opt to break the law and perform some
legally prohibited act (e.g., providing syringes to IDU patients
in some settings) they may characterize their actions as civil
disobedience or claim the defense of medical necessity.
1. Civil disobedience
The concept of civil disobedience has deep roots in
American political, social, and cultural history." Acts of
civil disobedience highlight injustices in society. Civil dis-
obedience is one means of taking action to bring about
change. 12 One hundred fifty years ago, Henry David Thoreau
argued that people should refuse to follow laws that they be-
lieve are unjust:
[Ilf it [the injustice] is of such a nature that it requires
you to be the agent of injustice to another, then, I say,
break the law.. .What I have to do is to see, at any rate,
that I do not lend myself to the wrong which I con-
demn.11
3
Thoreau's words speak directly to the issue at hand. Physicians
may face a conflict between their moral and ethical obligations
to their patients and their legal obligations as a member of soci-
ety. Medical evidence demonstrates the importance of sterile
syringes for IDUs. In this context, physicians and pharmacists
may conclude that the legal and structural obstacles are un-
just. 114 When a physician or pharmacist believes her moral obli-
gations outweigh her legal obligations, civil disobedience may
result. " 5
1 For a general review of civil disobedience in American history, see Bruce
Ledewitz, Civil Disobedience, Injunctions, and the First Amendment, 19 HOFsTRA L.
REV. 67, 71-80 (1990). See also Martin C. Loesch, Motive Testimony and a Civil
Disobedience Justification, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHcs & PUB. PoL'Y 1069, 1072-88
(1991).
12 See E.R. Shipp, Errors of Omission, WASH. POST, June 3, 1999, at B6
(discussing anti-war protests); see also Laura Brown, By His Own Hand, BOSTON
HERALD, Nov. 30, 1996, at 8 (discussing anti-abortion protests).
113 HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 243 (Sherman
Paul ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. 1960) (1854 & 1849).
1 4 See discussion infra Part MI.B.1.
115 See Loesch, supra note I 11, at 1087-90. See generally Mark E. DeForrest,
Comment, Civil Disobedience: Its Nature and Role in the American Legal Land-
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In order for an action to legally constitute civil disobedi-
ence, there are four elements that need to be met: (1) the act
must be illegal, (2) the act must be "predominantly nonviolent,"
(3) the act must be intended to rouse the notice of the commu-
nity to the illegal action, and (4) the actor must be willing to
accept punishment for his action. 1 6 Acting within this frame-
work, physicians and pharmacists can use civil disobedience as
a vehicle for social and political change. Two areas of medical
practice illustrate instances in which some physicians have
refused to obey what they perceive to be unjust laws.
Before Roe v. Wade1 7 was decided in 1973, establishing
a woman's right to choose to have an abortion, many physi-
cians challenged state and federal abortion statutes. Some
brought suits challenging the laws on their construction or
their impact on patient care.118 Others chose to act in their
patient's best interests, independent of legal constraints. For
example, California's Therapeutic Abortion Act of 1967
permitted physicians to perform abortions only in cases
where the procedure was necessary to preserve the life of his
or her patient.119 This vague language allowed physicians to
exercise discretion in determining when to perform an abor-
tion. Although this resulted in more patients obtaining abor-
scape, 33 GONZ. L. REv. 653, 660-63 (1997) (discussing the interplay between moral
order and enacted law in regard to civil disobedience).
116 See DeForrest, supra note 115, at 655-60; see also Loesch, supra note I11,
at 1092-94 (enumerating and discussing some of the constituent elements of civil
disobedience).
117 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a woman has Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendment protection over reproductive choices including abortion).
11S See. e.g., Doe v. Dunbar, 320 F. Supp. 1297 (D. Colo. 1970) (determining
standing under Colorado's therapeutic abortion act); Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp.
986 (D. Kan. 1972) (holding that objectionable provisions of Kansas abortion statutes
may be severed without perverting ultimate purpose of therapeutic abortions); Ken-
nan v. Warren, 328 F. Supp. 525 (W.D. Wis. 1971) (granting motion to temporarily
enjoin proceedings against physician performing abortions upon unquickened em-
bryos based on the finding that both physician and women had constitutional right to
perform or seek abortions, respectively); Planned Parenthood Ctr. of Tucson, Inc. v.
Marks, 497 P.2d 534 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (holding state abortion statutes are am-
biguous, and as applied, are invalid since they deprive petitioners of liberty without
due process of law); People v. Barksdale, 503 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1972) (holding that
abortion statute did not give adequate notice to physician of the prohibited conduct or
of procedures constituting compliance); Beecham v. Leahy, 287 A.2d 836 (Vt. 1972)
(challenging Vermont law prohibited abortion except where mother's life in danger).
19 Therapeutic Abortion Act, ch. 327, § 1, 1967 CAL. STATS. 1535 (codified
as amended at CAL. HEA' & SAFETY CODE §§ 25950-25955.3 (1995)).
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tions, courts did not always endorse physicians' judgments. 20
As a result, patients were able to obtain abortions through the
help of their physicians acting in the best interests of their
patients. 21 Ultimately, the Supreme Court established the as-
sumption that physicians had acted in the patient's best inter-
est unless proven otherwise.
22
In a more recent example, many physicians and profes-
sional associations emphatically signaled their intention to
disobey the law after California adopted Proposition 187 in
1994. This proposition required doctors, nurses, social work-
ers, and teachers to report any patient, client, or student that
they might suspect to be an illegal immigrant to authorities.
23
Because physicians' ethics, medical care, and patient confi-
dentiality were endangered by the proposition, the AMA's
policy-making body condemned Proposition 187.124 The
AMA voted to oppose any federal regulations that required
physicians to determine the immigration status of their pa-
tients before treating them.125 In addition, the 298,000 mem-
ber AMA reaffirmed its position requesting Congress to pro-
vide adequate funds for existing healthcare programs for ille-
120 Compare, e.g., People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 198-206 (Cal. 1969)
(holding that physician's convictions of abortion and conspiracy could not stand
when the term "necessary to preserve" was not susceptible to a construction that
could satisfy due process), and People v. Abarbanel, 239 Cal. App. 2d 31, 33
(Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that there was no showing that the physician per-
formed the abortion for a purpose other than to save the mother's life), with People v.
Wellman, 149 N.W.2d 908 (Mich. App. 1967).
121 See, e.g., Belous, 458 P.2d at 206; Abarbanel, 239 Cal. App. 2d. at 34-35.
'2 See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 71 (1971) (explaining that medi-
cal standards, malpractice law, and societal expectations provide physicians with
motivation to properly care for their patients).
123 See Vincent lacopino & Thomas Crane, Prop. 187:'A Prescription for
Disaster,' S.F. CHRON., Oct. 31, 1994, at A22 (condemning Proposition 187 as "a
prescription for a medical ethics, public health and human rights disaster").
124 See Nation In Brief-AMA: Proposition 187 is Bad Medicine, ATLANTA J.
& CONST., Dec. 8, 1994, at C6 (reporting AMA's vote to oppose Proposition 187
because it poses substantial health risks to California residents and presents a "breach
of physician ethics and patient confidentiality"); see also Sandra Jacobs, Immigration
Policy Blamed for TB's Comeback- Tracking Infected People Essential, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Apr. 23, 1995, at A27 (noting the belief of some physicians that Proposi-
tion 187 would hurt efforts to control tuberculosis).
125 See AMA Condemns Proposition 187, DES Monmws REG., Dec. 8, 1994, at
7 (announcing AMA's reaction to California's proposal to deny all state benefits
except emergency care to illegal immigrants).
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gal aliens.126 The AMA's president-elect, Dr. Lonnie Bristow,
said that the California measure poses "a breach of physician
ethics and patient confidentiality."' 27
In both these cases, pre-Roe v. Wade abortion laws and
Proposition 187, physicians also protested government intru-
sion into the doctor patient relationship."8 This theme of
seeking to preserve areas of medical decision-making from
government interference could also be raised by physicians
willing to prescribe syringes. Physicians have broken the law
in other contexts as well. Studies indicate that many physi-
cians have lied to insurers and other third-party payors to en-
sure their patients receive the proper care and coverage."29
Others have lobbied for the use of illegal drugs for medicinal
purposes, 30 while some have prescribed fatal doses of medi-
cation for terminally ill patients who seek help in ending their
own lives.131
Presently, the existing laws in most states make it risky for
health care providers such as physicians and pharmacists to
provide sterile syringes for IDUs.13 Therefore, the actions taken
by physicians and pharmacists to actively provide access for
IDUs to sterile syringes would constitute an illegal action that
satisfies the first requirement for civil disobedience. Physicians'
and pharmacists' actions of prescribing or dispensing syringes
12' See AMA Board Votes to Oppose Proposition 187, THE RECoRD, Dec. 8,
1994, at A27.
127 AMA Condemns Proposition 187, supra note 125.
125 See, e.g., Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121 (2d Cir. 1971) (arguing that
Connecticut abortion laws violate the constitutional rights of female physicians); Doe
v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (challenging validity of state statute
that interfered with physicians' ability to adequately counsel women seeking abor-
tions); Walsingham v. State, 250 So.2d 857, 862 (Fla. 1971) (stating that the govern-
ment should not hinder physician's ability to decide how to best care for patients);
lacopino & Crane, supra note 123; AMA Board Votes to Oppose Proposition 187,
supra note 126.
179 See Victor G. Freeman et al., Lying for Patients: Physician Deception of
Third-Party Payers, 159 ARCHIVE INTERNAL MED. 2263 (1999) (ascertaining situa-
tions in which physicians would deliberately deceive third-party payers in order to
get the payers' approval for care that was medically indicated).
'a See generally Abbie Crites-Leoni, Medicinal Use of Marijuana: Is the
Debate a Smoke Screen for Movement Toward Legalization?, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 273
(1998); Matthew W. Grey, Comment, Medical Use of Marijuana: Legal and Ethical
Conflicts in the Patient/Physician Relationship, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 249 (1996).
"'t See Derrick A. Carter, Knight in the Duel with Death: Physician Assisted
Suicide and the Medical Necessity Defense, 41 Vni. L. RuV. 663 (1996).
132 See Gostin & Lazzarini, supra note 4.
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are acts that take place everyday in physicians' offices and
pharmacies without any threat to the peace. In fact, their actions
"demonstrate that they assume the responsibility of community
membership and act with the best interests of the community in
mind."'1
33
By prescribing in the regular course of medical practice or
dispensing during the course of pharmacy business, physicians
and pharmacists make a conscious and public statement about
the injustice of the status quo. The degree of attention society
gives to such acts may vary, but one purpose of civil disobedi-
ence is to demonstrate to society, and the governing bodies that
oversee it, that the existing laws are unjust. 134 Where physicians
and other health care providers pursue civil disobedience, they
must be willing to accept the consequences associated with their
actions. 135 For professionals such as physicians and pharmacists,
who may face loss or suspension of licensure or even criminal
penalties, this represents a serious factor.
2. Medical necessity
Breaking the law, however, need not result in punishment if
physicians successfully claim a defense such as medical neces-
sity. The defense of necessity, generally, is that there are times
when individuals should be free from legal restraints in order to
prevent imminent harm, or to provide services that preserve life
and health. 136
For a physician to invoke the medical necessity defense, in
general, he or she must demonstrate four elements: (1) he or she
acted to avoid or prevent an imminent harm, (2) there were no
reasonable legal alternatives to violating the law, (3) the harm
of the act was not disproportionate to the harm avoided, and (4)
there was a reasonably anticipated causal relationship between
133 Loesch, supra note 111, at 1093.
134 See DeForrest, supra note 115, at 658 (citing Paul J. Weber, Toward a
Theory of Civil Disobedience, 13 CATH. LAW 198,202 (1967)).
35 See id. at 659.
136 See Steven M. Bauer & Peter I. Eckerstrom, The State Made Me Do It:
The Applicability of the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience, 39 STAN. L. REv.
1173, 1174 (1987) (citing United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409-11 (1980));
Doe v. Busbee, 471 F. Supp. 1326, 1328 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (discussing Medicaid reim-
bursement for abortion and other medically necessary services). For a general dis-
cussion of the necessity defense, see State v. Marley, 509 P.2d 1095, 1109 (Haw.
1973).
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the act and the harm avoided.1 37 It should be noted, however,
that the defense of medical necessity has been raised in a num-
ber of cases where state laws were violated by providing sy-
ringes to IDUs and has produced mixed results.) 8
A physician relying on the medical necessity defense needs
to show that he or she was acting under a reasonable belief,
supported by medical testimony and evidence, and that it was
necessary to break the law in order to avoid imminent injury.
Ample medical and public health evidence demonstrates that
giving IDUs access to sterile syringes to reduce HIV transmis-
sion does not increase drug use or crime. 139 Given the rising
numbers of ]DU-patients at risk for new infection or transmis-
sion of HIV to others,1 40 physicians can convincingly argue that
providing sterile syringes will avoid imminent infections.
In addition to acting against an imminent harm, a physician
should demonstrate that there was no reasonable legal alterna-
tive to prevent the spread of IV besides providing sterile sy-
ringes. Although physicians have other options, when examined
1 7 See Bauer & Eckerstrom, supra note 136, at 1175; James L. Cavallaro, Jr.,
Case Note, The Demise of the Political Necessity Defense: Indirect Civil Disobedi-
ence and United States v. Schoon, 81 CAL. L. REV. 351, 356 n.31 (1993) (citing
WAYNE R. LAFAva & AusTN W. Scorr, JR., CRmiNALLAW § 5.4(d) (2d ed. 1986));
see also United States v. Cassidy, 616 F.2d 101, 102 (4th Cir. 1979) (discussing how
reasonable belief alone, without other defense elements, is not sufficient to prove the
defense of necessity). Cf. Jenks v. State, 582 So. 2d 676, 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (holding that the elements of medical necessity are (a) that the defendant did
not intentionally bring about the circumstances precipitating the unlawful act, (b) that
the defendant could not accomplish the same objective using a less offensive altema-
tive, and (c) the evil sought to be avoided was more heinous than the unlawful act
perpetrated to avoid it).
n. Compare Commonwealth v. Leno, 616 N.E.2d 453 (Mass. 1993) (holding
physician was not entitled to necessity defense since harm was not imminent), State
v. McCague 714 A.2d 937, 942-43 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (holding the
defense inapplicable since the danger was not imminent) and State v. Sorge, 591
A.2d 1382 (N.J. Super. CL Law Div. 1991) (refusing to dismiss action against defen-
dant activists on the grounds that their actions were not such an extraordinary and
unanticipated mitigation that it clearly would have been exempt by the legislature had
the idea occurred to the legislature), with People v. Bordowitz, 588 N.Y.S.2d 507
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991) (allowing use of the medical necessity defense) and People v.
Monroe, 593 N.Y.S.2d 742 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1992) (holding that defendant was not
exempt from the ban on possession of hypodermic needles because he was a partici-
pant in Dept. of Health's needle exchange program).
139 See PANEL ON NEEDLE EXCH. & BLEACH DisTRIB. PROGRAMS, supra note
7, at 251-53.
140 See discussion itfra Part III.B.2 (discussing the rising numbers of AIDS
cases directly or indirectly related to injection drug use).
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closely, they are neither as effective nor reasonable solutions. 141
Physicians could counsel IDU-patients to stop using drugs, stop
injecting, or enter treatment. Unequivocally these options, if
successful, would benefit the patient and reduce their HIV risk.
Physicians should attempt to persuade IDUs to take one of these
steps. However, many IDUs are unready to stop or unable to
enter treatment when they are ready. Additionally, physicians
could counsel patients to use only sterile equipment obtained in
pharmacies or SEPs. As demonstrated, however, the legal cli-
mate does not always permit IDUs to obtain syringes this way,
and thus, this is not a viable option. Therefore, the only reason-
able and effective means of preventing the transmission of
deadly blood-borne diseases by injection drug use, for patients
who are unable or unwilling to quit, is to ensure that the patients
use sterile syringes when injecting drugs.
Coupled with the lack of reasonable legal alternatives, the
action taken should not be disproportionate to the harm
avoided. 42 Specifically, the physician should show that his or
her breaking of the law produces less harm than that resulting
from the spread of HIV and other blood borne diseases. Beyond
the arguments based on economic costs, compassion argues that
IDUs should be permitted to avoid deadly infections where
simple means of prevention exist. Additionally, protecting IDUs
from HIV and hepatitis will also benefit the public health, both
directly through fewer cases of disease among IDUs and indi-
rectly through fewer cases among their sex partners and chil-
dren.
Finally, the physician needs to show that there was a direct
causal relationship between his or her action and the imminent
harm avoided. While some courts have recognized availability
of sterile syringes as a means to prevent imminent harm, others
have not.143 Arguably, physicians providing IDUs access to
sterile syringes fulfill this test. The problem of transmission and
spread of HIV, as well as other blood borne diseases, is directly
related to the use of contaminated syringes by IDUs. Substantial
141 See Bauer & Eckerstrom, supra note 136, at 1180 (discussing fact that
legal alternatives must not simply be available, but effective alternatives to problem).142 See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409-10 (1980) (describing how
actors can make the defense of necessity when the actor is forced to choose the lessor
of two evils).
143 For a listing of cases where courts have and have not recognized sterile
syringes as legal means to prevent imminent harm, see supra note 138.
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evidence suggests that providing IIDUs with sterile syringes will
reduce the risk of disease transmission.
Official state action to consider, accept, or reject various
public health measures also may pose problems for those
claiming medical necessity as a defense or seeking to challenge
existing laws in other ways. Where defendants have violated the
law, arguing medical necessity as a defense, courts have often
looked at whether the legislature has already considered the
health threat in question. Where the legislature has already
acted, courts have tended to defer to its determinations. For ex-
ample, in one case, the court rejected arguments of medical ne-
cessity where the legislature had defeated a proposal to liberal-
ize access to syringes. 44
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the topic of drug use and the correct stance of the
government and private practitioners in dealing with IDUs con-
tinues to excite emotions and raise substantial debate, a careful
analysis of ethical and legal duties suggests a more active and
positive role for physicians and pharmacists in preventing HIV
infection among IDUs than has often been described. Physi-
cians' primary responsibility to help their patients extends to
protecting the health of their drug-addicted patients who cannot,
or will not, stop injecting drugs. Where no legal means exist for
IDUs to access sterile syringes, and therefore, practice safe in-
jection, physicians can easily argue that ethical imperatives
support providing prescriptions to IDUs as part of a comprehen-
sive HIV prevention and care strategy. Pharmacists, also ethi-
cally bound to put "the well-being of [their] patient[s] at the
center of [their] professional practice[s]," 145 can argue that
similar imperatives support their filling of such prescriptions.
From a legal perspective, physicians could argue that pre-
scribing syringes fits easily within an evolving standard of care
based on new empirical evidence, practice guidelines, and the
views of a respectable and qualified minority. Pharmacists can
argue that the legal standard of risk management supports their
filling prescriptions for syringes for IDUs and their active role
in counseling IDUs on safe injection practices and disposal of
14 See Commonwealth v. Leno, 616 N.E.2d 453,455 (Mass. 1993).
145American Pharm. Ass'n, supra note 41.
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syringes. The weight of arguments in this analysis of ethical and
legal approaches to the question of prescribing syringes to IDUs
suggests that prescribing and/or dispensing syringes is ethically
permissible. Less evidence supports a general affirmative obli-
gation to prescribe or dispense.
Laws do exist that might be invoked against physicians,
pharmacists, or IDUs. The approach of the courts to such cases
remains difficult to predict. At least theoretically, the defense of
medical necessity provides an option for any of these parties,
should criminal charges be brought against them.
